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1.  Introduction 
In a somewhat self-defeating manner, it could be asked, whether it is worthwhile to analyse the 
Swedish agricultural policy reform of 1990. In the end, almost everything had to be reversed after 
Sweden has joined the EU. However, it could be argued that the reform is still interesting. Radical 
attempts at reforming agricultural policy are rare and, hence, worth to be examined, and the reform 
was, indeed, very radical. All internal market regulations were abolished. Farmers were offered only a 
modest and temporary compensation. Analysing the Swedish reform of 1990, Daugbjerg, a Danish 
political scientist, observes that “compared to the EC and other Western countries the Swedes chose a 
radical solution. In the EC, question was not whether the EC should subsidise agriculture but how it 
should be done. In Sweden agriculture was deregulated” Daugbjerg (1998). 
 
The fact that the Swedish government applied for the membership in the EU so soon after the reform 
has been decided, raises the question whether the possibility of joining the EU in the near future was 
not considered by the agriculture policy reformers. Sometimes it is even claimed by observers from 
the outside that the reform was intended to prepare Swedish agriculture for the expected future 
membership in the Union. It is obvious from the design of the reform, moving Swedish agricultural 
policy away from the CAP, that this was not the case. The fact that the reform was not adapted to the 
CAP is a clear indication that there is no causal link between the anticipated membership and the 
Swedish agricultural policy reform (Daugbjerg, 1998). 
  
The paper aims at identifying driving forces that made such a radical reform possible, in particular the 
ambition is to set apart idiosyncrasies of Swedish politics and the factors that could be generalised to 
other countries. Because the membership in the EU distorted and eventually interrupted the 
implementation of the reform it is hardly meaningful to provide a detailed examination thereof. Only 
major features of the process will be analysed.  
 
2.  Methodological approach 
Pressure group model is most commonly used to explain why governments do what they do in 
agriculture. According to pressure group theory, small effective groups are considered more important 
for domestic policy formation because their comparative advantage in controlling free riding 
outweighs the relatively small numbers of votes these groups may deliver in an election.  
However, the opportunistic approach to policy formation neglects the issue of how democratic 
political institutions constrain elected politicians to align their behaviour with voters' interests, 
(Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997). In particular, it is difficult to identify plausible social 
mechanisms, through which small groups could compensate for their insignificant number of votes. 
Direct investments in political favours are considerably inhibited by political institutions of European 
society. Moreover, resources spent on lobbying by farmers are almost negligible in comparison to the 
large transfers generated by the agricultural policy (Kristofersson, 1994). If transfers to farmers were 
the result of successful lobbying, one would expect other special interest groups, especially in 
corporate societies where organised pressure groups abound, to follow the example especially since 
many of them are commanding substantially more resources than farmers do and could, therefore, 
afford to invest more. Other pressure groups seem, however, not to be able to secure comparable 
transfers.  
 
Instead of spending on campaign contributions, pressure groups in Western Europe tend to appeal to 
the general public invoking such issues as equity and the wider social benefits of policies for which 
they seek support. Farmers’ influence over agricultural policy has been channelled though a positive 
inclination of consumers and taxpayers. In particular, agricultural policy has been facilitated by 
pressure groups appealing to several consensus-generating causes (equity, food security, rural 
amenities, and environmental protection). However, it would be wrong to fully attribute support to 
agricultural policy to indoctrination by interest groups, as argued by Becker (1983). Preferences 
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the consensus-generating arguments mentioned above. Without helpful influence of agrarian 
fundamentalism, they would never manage to gain as much support as they do. Rabinowicz (1993) 
attributed the fundamentalism to bounded rationality of the consumers arguing that agricultural 
policies are credited for positive effects they fail to deliver. 
 
Political economy models explain policy formation in a black-box fashion relying on unobservable 
and somewhat illusory concept such as influence function and ignoring ideology and partisanship in 
voting. Because of this feature those models do not lend themselves easily to an analysis of a process 
of policy reform. Kristow et al (1992) claim that "the more context-specific the political outcome to be 
explained, the more crucial is a clear view of the decision process of the policy makers at the top". 
Following this argument, the analysis of agricultural policy reform in this paper will be based on an 
explicit account of the underlying political process. Moreover, the analysis will not be based on an 
opportunistic but on partisan approach. In partisan models (Hibbs, 1977) different political parties 
represent the interests of different constituencies and, when in office, follow policies that are 
favourable to their supporting groups. Existence of special interests parties in Sweden, such an 
agrarian party and a labour party, makes such an approach plausible for an analysis of Swedish 
politics. Moreover, changing patterns of co-operation in the parliament may be influenced by factors 
unrelated to farm interests and yet have important implications for the strategic position of farmers. 
This implies that it may be difficult to analyse agricultural policy in a partial setting. 
 
The discussion above boils down to somewhat eclectic approach for the subsequent analysis focussing 
on legitimacy of the agricultural policy and putting major emphasis on the political process behind the 




3.  Swedish economy in the pre-reform period 
A detailed account is beyond the scope and interest of this paper. In several aspects Swedish economy 
was experiencing a favourable development during late 80s. Economy was growing at about 3% per 
annum and unemployment was low. However, the economy was also exhibiting quite a few 
macroeconomic imbalances (persistent budget deficit, fast growing government debt and high level of 
inflation) as well as several structural problems. Kjell-Olof Feldt, minister of finance at the time 
argued (Sohlman, 2003), that due to those structural problems it was not possible to pursue meaningful 
stabilisation policy in Sweden. Mr Feldt emphasised strongly a need of structural reforms of the 
Swedish economy such as deregulation of credit market, major tax reform and reform of agricultural 
policy. Several market-oriented reforms have also taken place. Credit market was deregulated in 1985. 
After several years of negotiations, major tax reform was decided in 1990. Several product markets 
were deregulated as well. 
 
Level of inflation is especially worth mentioning since the rate of inflation in Sweden tended 
systematically to be higher than inflation in countries competing with Swedish industry. The resulting 
appreciation of the real exchange rate and ensuing loss of competitiveness had been remedied by 
devaluations of nominal exchange rate of Swedish crown. The crown was devaluated on four 
occasions in the 70s and early 80s. By the end of the 80s, an almost universal consensus emerged that 
an accommodation policy of this type was detrimental for the Swedish economy in the long run and 
that Sweden should commit to a fix exchange rate. Accordingly, fighting inflation emerged as an 
important policy priority.  
 
4.  Swedish politics in the pre-reform period 
4.1 Political parties 
A proportional electoral system is applied in Sweden following since 1971 the principle of strict 
proportionality. An electoral system of this kind tends to produce minority governments. Since 1971, 
Sweden has not had a majority government. At the time of agricultural policy reform, six parties were 
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largest party, has been the main actor in government formation in Sweden during the post war period. 
The Social Democrats do not compete for farm votes and have been emphasising consumer interests in 
the agricultural policy formation. It was a Social Democratic government that created the Consumer 
Delegation (compare below).  
 
The Centre Party (until the 60s the Peasant Federation) represents middle size farmers. Large farmers 
and landowners tend to some extent vote for the Conservative Party. Declining number of farmers 
induce the Centre Party to take on other issues such as preservation of natural environment. Protection 
of farm interest has, however, remained the key priority. The remaining parties were (in order of size): 
Conservatives, Liberals, Left Party (ex-communists) and Environmental Party – The Greens.  
 
Coalition politics in Sweden features a two-block competition within the multi-party system. 
Coalitions or even collaborations between socialist and non-socialist parties have been rare and have 
been confined to parties close to each other on the left/right scale. Due to its centrist position, the 
Centre Party has been an attractive (potential) co-operation partner for both political blocks. Until the 
80s, the Centre Party (or its predecessor) was the only right-of-centre party the SAP could consider as 
a co-operation partner.  
 
4.2 Interest groups 
Swedish farmers are organised in the Federation of Swedish Farmers (LRF). LRF has strong ties with 
the Centre party. The centrist position of the party (compare above) has favoured farmers turning them 
into something of a “median voter“. LRF had always tended to strongly reject any ideas about 
agricultural policy reform. However, under the influence of a newly elected leader the organisation 
produced in 1988 a strategy document entitled “Change of Track” which endorsed a more market-
oriented agriculture. The strategy document could be easily dismissed as a “lip service”. But this begs 
the question why Swedish farmers would consider it worthwhile, in contrast to their past behaviour 
and unlike their colleagues in other European countries and elsewhere, to pay such a service. Instead, 
the behaviour of LRF could be described as “conversion under threat”. LRF realised that some kind of 
agricultural policy reform was unavoidable and that farmers’ interests would be served better by 
participating in the process of change than by opposing it (Dockered, 2003). Moreover, LFR believed 
that Swedish consumers had a willingness to pay for higher quality, environmental friendliness and 
food safety and that Swedish agricultural products could be marketed as delivering those qualities, 
hence, surviving a more competitive environment (Dockered, op cit). The reason why LFR judged that 
reform of agricultural policy was to be expected was the ongoing intense criticism of the policy in the 
public debate (see section 6.2) as well as critical reports commissioned/produced by the government 
(see section 6.3) indicating that the government was interested in reform of the policy.    
   
A unique feature of the Swedish system was the existence of consumers’ representation, the Consumer 
Delegation (CD), in agricultural policy matters. The CD was created in 1963 by a Social Democratic 
government with a clear intention of changing the balance of power between consumers and producers 
(Andersson, 1987). The CD was, however, an artificial representation of consumers. Members of the 
CD were always appointed by the government and consisted of representatives of labour unions, 
processing industry and trade. The CD had a small staff of own experts. Together with the LRF, the 
CD was participating in parliamentary committees on agricultural policy, in semi- annual price 
reviews that were organised as deliberations between the LRF and in the implementation of the policy.  
 
 
5.  Agriculture and agricultural policy prior to the reform 
5.1 Brief history of agricultural policy in Sweden 
It may be useful to put the reform decision of 1990 in a historical perspective by looking briefly how 
the policy had developed before. Agricultural policy decision of 1947 formalised instruments, mainly 
price support, introduced already in the 1930s. Income parity for farmers and food security (self-
sufficiency in basic foods) became main policy objectives. Agricultural policy was re-examined by 
1960 Committee on Agriculture reaching agricultural policy decision in 1967. The decision 
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to not less than 80 per cent (for defence reasons). Agricultural prices were to increase more slowly 
(“price pressure”) to push resources out agriculture. Pre-pension schemes and resettlement subsidies 
encouraged the mobility of agricultural labour.  
 
The policy continued along these lines until 1971: real price to farmers decreased by 15%, milk 
production fell to the lowest level since WWII. The number of milk producers went down by 40 per 
cent. Between 1966 and 1971 agricultural labour (in man-hours) declined by 30%. Than the policy 
was reversed. Farm prices were allowed to increase again. New agricultural policy decision was taken 
in 1977 emphasising income distribution rather than efficiency and growth and making farm income 
the prime objective of agricultural policy. Existing arable land was to be kept in production and 
resulting surpluses were to be exported as grain rather than livestock products.  Implementation of 
agricultural policy decision of 1977 resulted in growing surpluses of agricultural products and proved 
unsustainable. A new decision was taken in 1985. Food security was reinstated as a prime objective. 
Consumer objective was given equal status with farm income objective. Farm prices were no longer to 
be raised automatically as cost increased.    
 
As it can be seen from the brief description above, Sweden had a history of radical policy reforms 
prior to 1990 decision but also of policy reversals. It is also interesting to note that radical policy of the 
60s coincided with fast economic growth, labour shortages in industry and low world market prices for 
agricultural products. Social Democrats had a majority of their own. Policy reversal in the 70s 
corresponded to higher world market prices, concerns for global food security, slow economic growth  
and ensuing lower demand for labour. “Green wave” emerging in the wake of “Limits to growth” 
debate was also benefiting agriculture. Moreover, at the time 1977 policy decision was taken, the 
government consisted of a coalition of non-socialist parties and both Prime Minister and agricultural 
minister were ex-farmers. Generalising from past experiences, ideology, economics and politics 
appear jointly as factors driving development of agricultural policy in Sweden.  
 
 
5.2 Main features of agricultural policy prior to the reform 
In short, agricultural policy in Sweden was predominantly based on price support, applied restrictively 
in the 60s, generously in the 70s and somewhat in between in the 80s. Structural policy played a 
relatively minor role. Domestic prices of agricultural commodities were determined by semi-annual 
price reviews based on negotiations/deliberations between LRF and the Consumer Delegation. 
Development of production cost index for agricultural inputs constituted a base for the negotiations 
but a strict cost-price formula was not longer applied. The negotiations covered even primary 
processing of agricultural products: diaries and slaughterhouses. Here, compensation claims rested on 
historical accounting costs. 
 
Variable import levies were used to protect the agreed level of domestic prices at the border. 
Mandatory domestic market interventions were applied to all major agricultural commodities and were 
implemented by seven semi-public Marketing Associations, which were also in charge of exports and 
export subsidies.  Export subsidies for livestock products were financed by producers through special 
levies, which were automatically raised in case outlays were increasing. In case of grains, however, 
export subsidies were financed from several sources including the government budget. A justification 
of using producer-financed export subsidies was the principle that income guarantees for farmers 
should, with exception of grains, only be extended to production for domestic market. Because of this 
feature, the Swedish policy was less prone to financial crises than the CAP. However, increasing grain 
surpluses and low world market prices in late 80s caused an increasing burden on the budget. 
   
Sweden was also applying supply control measures for milk (quota introduced in about the same time 
as in the EU) and sugar. The sugar quota were based on acreage and corresponded to roughly 90% of 
domestic consumption in order to allow for import from developing countries. Set-aside schemes were 
in place for grains. Total level of support in Sweden, measured as PSE, was 1990 57%. 
 
  46.  Driving forces behind the reform 
6.1 Politics 
Social-democratic party, which has been dominating the post war politics in Sweden, had traditionally 
collaborated with the ex- agrarian Centre Party, mostly from a position of a minority government, 
occasionally in the form of government coalition. Support for the agricultural policy was always a sine 
qua non condition for such a co-operation. In the 80s this traditional pattern of co-operation had 
changed, though. Several important compromises, most notably on the reform of the tax system, were 
reached with the Liberal Party. Being willing (and able) to choose other parties than the agrarians for 
an occasional support, Social-democrats were not forced to avoid agricultural policy reform. This 
political reorientation was probably an important precondition for the reform of 1990 since it implied a 
loss of strategic position of the agrarians/farmers. A possible exogenous factor underlying the coalition 
formation was an ideological reorientation of the Social Democratic Party in more market-oriented 
direction. 
 
6.2 Values and legitimacy 
Legitimacy of agricultural policy was declining during the 80s. Several factors have contributed to the 
decline: discontent with food prices, changing public preferences with respect to farm income vis a vis 
environment and increasing awareness among consumers and taxpayers about the impact of the policy.  
Food prices are seldom an issue in industrialised countries, in particular in the EU (Buckwell, 1992). 
This was not the case in Sweden, however.  Swedish consumers, on the other hand, had more causes to 
feel dissatisfaction. Food prices in Sweden were very high according to international standards. 
Comparisons of PPP indicated that Swedish food prices (1990) were 60 % above the EU level, whilst 
prices in general only 35-40% (Bolin, Swedenborg, 1992). Moreover, food prices were also rising in 
real terms during most of the 80s. This was partly due to gradual removal of food subsidies, which 
were introduced in the 70s. As a result consumers were exposed to increases of farm prices which 
have accumulated during several years but were hidden by subsidies, in a short time. The increase of 
real food prices resulted in visible signs of dissatisfaction such as consumers identifying high food 
prices as a pressing social problem in public opinion pools.  
Farm income became less and less of an issue in the Swedish politics during the 80s. This was due to: 
small share of agriculture in the total employment (less that 3%), low dependence of farm households 
on incomes from agriculture and good opportunities to find job outside farming because of low 
unemployment. At the same time anxiety about the environment was gaining momentum. Unlike the 
70s, agriculture was not longer seen as synonymous with natural resources conservation but 
increasingly blamed for loss of biodiversity, nitrogen leakages and residuals of pesticides in food etc. 
In these circumstances, policy focusing on farm incomes rather than on environment was perceived by 
the public to address wrong priorities. 
An important factor contributing to fading legitimacy was an intense agricultural policy debate that 
took place in Sweden. Agricultural policy reform was put on the agenda by publishing a debate book 
“Political economy of food“, Bolin et al (1984). The book challenged the popular, consensus-
generating arguments for protection and argued for a complete liberalisation of agricultural trade. The 
book caused an outrage from farmers and generated an extensive public discussion, see Palmgren 
(1985) for an analysis. Most important features of this debate was that it was not restricted to the 
academia but to a large extent conducted on debate pages of leading daily newspapers and that it also 
involved new stakeholders. Government bodies outside the jurisdiction of agriculture, independent 
researchers, some of the political parties and others advanced reform proposals. Several books, reports, 
statements and articles were published. This implied that new stakeholderS emerged on the arena and 
that traditional interest groups, specialised agricultural politicians and bureaucracy have lost their 
monopoly over agenda setting in agricultural policy matters. 
Changes in public sentiments with respect to agriculture can be confirmed by looking at public 
opinion pools. LRF has been commissioning public opinion pools about public attitudes to farming for 
a long time (LFR, 2003). The respondents have been asked similar question since 1980. Hence, the 
answers can be used as an indication of changes in public opinion. Share of the respondents agreeing 
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produce at home than to import” dropped considerably in late 80s and early 90s. Similarly, fewer 
respondents agreed that “ it is a waste of social resources not to cultivate the land”, or “ in a hungry 
world it is immoral for a country not too produce its own food.” Likewise, fewer people than before 
agreed that agriculture should be supported because it “generates employment”. The above mentioned 
changes in public opinion taken together point in the direction of a more critical public opinion which 
is concerned about high food prices and less susceptible to agricultural fundamentalism.  
  
6.3 Driving forces behind the reform: Economic considerations 
Evaluating the performance of the agricultural policy it should be observed that Swedish agricultural 
policy was mainly based on price support. Agricultural policy of this type produces well-known 
drawbacks: low transfer efficiency with respect to farm income, capitalisation of the support in the 
asset values, uneven distribution of support favouring mainly large farms and fertile land etc. Lasting 
criticism of agricultural policy through the general debate (compare above) made the politicians aware 
of these drawbacks. A report published by the Department of Finance (Finansdepartamentet, 1988) 
concluded that agricultural high price policy was the reason the farm sector attracted resources that 
could be more efficiently used elsewhere. According to minister of finance, K-O Feldt (1991), the 
Department of Finance was not particularly concerned with the budgetary costs but with indirect 
impacts of agricultural policy that is welfare losses and inflation. Feldt and a group around him saw 
agricultural policy as one of structural problems of Swedish economy (Solman, 2003). 
 
Looking at the malfunctioning of the Swedish agricultural policy, two important aspects should be 
specially emphasised, namely, impact of the policy on inflation and the relevance of the food security 
argument. As pointed out before, high level of inflationary pressure had become a major political 
concern in the Swedish economic policy at the time. Agricultural price negotiations resulting in an 
instant upward adjustment of food prices were seen as problematic not only because of the direct 
impact on the Consumer Price Index but also because they contributed to inflation expectations and to 
a perception of the inflation as something normal. Twice a year, once the negotiations were concluded, 
it was completely normal for all retailers to raise food prices of regulated commodities. Moreover, lack 
of the competition in primary processing, which was compensated for cost increases, was also seen as 
a factor contributing to fast increase of the production costs in those sectors.     
 
Winters (1987) argues that policy statements should be seen as excuses rather than real objectives – if 
they really mattered the policy would have been different. However, food security objective in Sweden 
was more than just an excuse. Food security or “readiness” to use the official term was strongly linked 
to the policy of neutrality of Sweden. Readiness to assure adequate food supply in case of war or trade 
blockade was seen as important to enhance credibility of the neutrality. The readiness was 
operationalised as an ability to provide 3000 Kcal per person and day sustained up to three years, later 
on one year, in isolation. This in turn was translated to production objectives for main agricultural 
commodities. Fertilisers and pesticides were kept in storage for strategic reasons. However, the official 
defence scenario of Sweden, was rapidly loosing its justification following the changes on the 
international scene in the 80s. As a “preamble“ to the agricultural policy reform the government 
commissioned, from National Defence Research Institute, an investigation about the appropriateness 
of the present agricultural policy with respect to food security requirements. (Molander, 1987). The 
results of the study indicated that the stated defence objective could be reached at a much lover level 
of self-sufficiency. The two reports mentioned above became central in the policy process (Daugbjerg, 
1998).  
7.  Reform of 1990 
7.1 Other reforms related to agricultural sector 
Agricultural policy reform of 1990 was not an isolated incident. As pointed out before, the reform can 
be linked to structural reforms outside agriculture. In addition, several changes of regulations related 
to agriculture have taken place at about the same time. Most notably, milk quota system, introduced in 
1984 was abolished in 1989. Moreover, crop insurance was reformed in 1987. The previous system, 
which had been operated by Board of Agriculture, a state authority, and relied heavily on government 
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accumulated funds. Thereafter, the responsibility of the government was limited to coverage of total 
crop failures, defined as a situation when the value of the crop is lower than harvesting cost, and 
affecting large areas. The common denominator of all three reforms is market liberalisation.  
 
7.2 Drafting the reform proposal 
The ministry of finance undoubtedly initiated the reform. Mr Solman, newly appointed secretary of 
state in the Ministry of Agriculture, who started the process, came directly from a position of a Budget 
Director in the Ministry of Finance.   
 
In the past, all major revisions of agricultural policy were prepared by parliamentary committees 
working for several years to evaluate agricultural policy and draft reform proposal. Similar work in 
case of the 1990 reform was organised in a novel and unorthodox way, namely as a parliamentary 
Working Group under the Ministry of Agriculture. The working group consisted of seven MPs with 
Social Democrats, who were in power, holding two seats. Micheletti (1990) observes that the status of 
the group was unique. Firstly it was not a state commission and secondly, interest groups were given a 
minor role. The Working Group allowed LRF to participate only in some meetings. Furthermore, 
farmers were not allowed to submit minority statement. Contrary to previous praxis in similar 
circumstances, the secretary of the group was not recruited from agricultural bureaucracy. Instead, P. 
Molander who wrote the Defence Research Institute’s report, mentioned above, was appointed. 
 
Also the effort of preparing the draft was organised in an unorthodox way and based on a strategy 
aiming to achieve a consensus about the impact of the price support and to avoid a bias towards 
proposals implying only marginal improvement of the existing policy (Molander, 2003). To 
accomplish that objective members of the group were involved in an intensive study/seminar activity 
meeting once a week with various experts. 40 meetings were organised. Discussion on specific policy 
proposals was postponed. Moreover, the policy discussion started with a vision of an ideal policy. The 
question how the present policy should be changed to move closer to the identified ideal solution was 
raised first at the end. The leader of LFR ironically described the approach as a “study circle” 
(Molander op cit). The approach proved to be successful. Working Group agreed that high prices had 
negative and unintended consequences in the farming sector and that price support was capitalised, 
which in turn decreased incomes of young farmers. The working group concluded also that that was 
no income problem in agriculture, denouncing the specificity hypothesis. In academic circles, such 
views are commonplace but politicians not always realise or at least seldom admit that such statements 
may be true. Here, a group of MPs, from the left to the right and including a representative of agrarian 
Centre Party, endorsed the ideas. 
 
Taking into account how radical the consequences of the reform were (compare below), the reaction of 
Farmers’ Federation (LFR) was relatively mild. A question could be asked why Swedish farmers 
accepted the decision rather than taking to the streets. However, in the climate of consensual policy 
making that prevails in Sweden (Miles 2001) such an action would, probably, had been counter 
productive. Moreover, as pointed out before, LRF had already anticipated and accepted that 
agricultural policy was bound to change. At end of the process, LFR advanced an alternative reform 
proposal, implying smaller changes of the policy and a longer adjustment period. However, at this 
stage all the MPs in the group were so committed to the internal deregulation proposal that nobody, 
not even the Centre party has supported LRF. 
 
Riksdag’s Standing Committee on Agriculture made some alteration to the proposal of the 
parliamentary working group. Despite these alterations, the changes made by the parliament did not 
change the ultimate objective of the reform package, which was to achieve a complete internal 
deregulation within a five-year period. (OECD, 1995, p.52) 
 
8.3 Short description of the reform 
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described below. Level of border protection was left unchanged, referring to an expected lowering of 
tariffs as a result of the GATT negotiations. 
  
Changes in the market regulations 
Within a framework of unchanged level of border protection all internal market regulations were 
eliminated, in some case after a transition period. Marketing Associations ceased to exist. Export 
subsidies were to be abolished, again after a transition period. Semi-annual price reviews were 
terminated. 
 
Measures to ease the impact of the reform and facilitate adjustment to a new equilibrium 
Both social measures aiming directly at relieving impact on farm incomes and wealth and measures 
intending to facilitate exit of farm resources were included. The former included temporary, degressive 
compensatory payments on per acreage basis. The payment was relatively modest. The payments were 
to be paid during 4 years. A guarantee against bankruptcies was offered for farmers risking serious 
economic problems due to the reform. Farmers who had bought their properties after 1980 could sell 
them to the state if the farmer was risking a bankruptcy and was not able to sell the property on the 
open market. To facilitate removal/ transfer of land to alternative uses, farmers who durably removed 
land from production could collect whole compensation amount in one payment. The durable removal 
was defined as five years withdrawal from production. In addition, milk farmers between 60 and 65 
were offered a pension. No other adjustment measures were envisioned. However, the policy 
document emphasised the need to use existing general policy, which in case of Sweden are extensive 
and ambitious, to facilitate the adjustment of farm sector. The measures that were mentioned were in 
particular labour market policies, start subsidy for new enterprises and education programmes 
(Jordbruksdepartamentet, 1989).  
 
Accompanying measures 
Funds allocated to rural development were increased by 100 millions SEK. In addition an 




8.  Expected outcome and implementation 
The removal of milk quota that has preceded the 1990 reform, has not resulted in any dramatic change 
of milk production, which rose by 0.4% 1990 and fell by 8% next year, contradicting the widespread 
belief that quota can never be removed without causing a supply explosion. However, at the time of 
the removal the 1990-reform was already in the pipe-line making farmers very pessimistic about the 
future. Therefore the quota became probably not binding.  
The expected impact of the reform of 1990 was by no means insignificant. The Swedish agriculture, 
which was producing considerable surpluses of some commodities, was intended to adjust to the 
domestic market. By banning of export subsidies the reform was anticipated to have greatest impact on 
commodities produced in surplus at previous prices. The most affected commodity group was grains, 
where the surplus was about 25%. According to estimates made by Jonasson (1992) the grain prices 
were expected to fall by 20%, beef prices by 9%, pork by 5% and milk products by 3% when the 
reform was fully implemented. The reform was, moreover, expected to cause a substantial reduction of 
producer surplus and push the land values close to zero, with the exception of the fertile southern 
plains. 
 
The implementation of the reform started in July 1991. Shortly after, the Swedish government applied 
for the membership in the EU. The fact that the reform was not adjusted to the CAP and its 
implementation would have induced significantly different type of adjustment than adjustment to the 
EU, made the whole situation very complicated. The difference was specially visible in case of grains 
which were expected to suffer from the removal of export subsidies, but which were highly 
competitive under EU-prices. The final political decision to join the Union was conditioned on a 
favourable outcome of the referendum. At the same time public opinion pools indicated a small and 
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be described as genuine uncertainty. To begin with, the implementation of the reform proceeded, as if 
nothing had happened but the process became more and more difficult to sustain as the time passed 
and the negotiations proceeded quite quickly. Below, a short account of what happened to the reform 
process until the Swedish accession to the Union is presented below. (All factual information below is 
based on SOU 1994:119) 
•  Internal market regulations were removed. The intervention system for grains was, however, 
extended one year. This was motivated by the need to achieve stability until the membership issue 
is settled. The removal of the Market Regulation Associations proceeded without noticeable 
disruptions. 
•  Prices of agricultural products declined. Between 1989 and 1993 producer prices fell in nominal 
terms by almost 10%, which was equivalent to a real decline by 30.2%. Also food prices declined, 
however, only in real terms. The nominal price increase was 7%, in real terms prices fell by 17%.  
•  Production of agricultural products fell but not markedly. Milk declined to 92% of 1989 level in 
1992 but then started to pick up again. Similar is the case for pork. Lower pork prices contributed 
to increased consumption and improved balance on the domestic market. The number of sheep and 
suckling cows increased considerably.  
•  380 000 hectares of arable land was taken out from production (“restructured”) mainly at the 
beginning of the period. However, only 80 000 was estimated to be permanently transferred to 
alternative uses.  
•  Structural change in farming was speeded up, in particular during the first years of the reform. 
Number of farms declined from 98 600 in 1989 to 91 500 in 1993. 
•  Because compensation payments were still in place when Sweden joined the EU, farm incomes 
developed favourably. Anti-bankruptcy measures were not put to a test. 
 
It is quite obvious that expectation of a possible future membership in the EU affected the 
implementation of the reform. This was, in particular, visible for land where not much of permanent 
restructuring had taken place and where farmers’ interest to sign for the program ceased with time. 
Moreover, increasing numbers of sheep and growing investments in milk production reflected 
concerns with possible future eligibility under EU agricultural policy regimes rather than current 
profitability. In short, the Swedish farmers simply decided to wait and see avoiding “irreversible“ 
decisions until the membership issue was settled.  
 
 
9.  Impact of the EU membership 
Because the accession to the EU has caused such an important impact on the process of 
implementation of the Swedish reform, it may be in place to shortly discuss the implication of the 
Swedish membership. Farm prices declined modestly, as the reform of 1990 had produced larger 
effects on prices than the EU accession. Also in the case of consumer prices agricultural policy reform 
and reduction of VAT on food had larger impact than the accession to the EU. On aggregate, 
production decisions of Swedish farmers have not been influenced significantly by the EU accession. 
Firstly, prices have not changed markedly. Secondly, agricultural production in the EU is governed by 
a number of supply management parameters (quotas, base acreage, number of animals eligible for 
support etc.) and Sweden managed to achieve the level of those parameters that were close to the 
historical production, land use etc. 
 
Most visible effect of the accession can be seen in the primary food processing industry. According to 
the economic theory, high protection rates and small domestic markets with low competitive pressure 
are likely to result in low efficiency. Primary processing could be expected to exhibit both technical 
inefficiency and scale inefficiency. Empirical analyses of competitiveness of food processing industry 
in Sweden, which were made prior to the accession, confirmed this theoretical prediction. Especially 
slaughterhouses were identified as facing considerable difficulties (Hanf and Böckenhöff 1993). 
Systematic research on the impact of the accession on the efficiency in processing is not yet available. 
Causal observation confirms that the ex ante assessment of competitiveness was correct, especially in 
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activities (all meat co-ops merged to one) involving closing plant and reducing employment.  
 
 
10. Analysis, discussion and final conclusions 
The analysis in preceding sections demonstrates quite clearly that the attempt to reform agricultural 
policy in Sweden was, in several aspects, very radical. The first radical element of the reform connects 
to the size of the income redistribution involved. Especially with respect to the issue of 
compensations, which were very modest, the Swedish reform represented a new and radical approach 
forgoing the principle of time-unlimited compensations for one time price change and focusing on 
social hardship rather than on the absolute size of the income loss. The underlying philosophy was that 
compensations/adjustment measures should be paid not because past policy automatically creates an 
entitlement for future support but because the society has an obligation, in agriculture and elsewhere, 
to abolish past policies under socially acceptable conditions. Linking transition support to the ability 
of farmers to cope with the policy change could be argued to constitute a valuable example to consider 
while designing adjustment measures. 
The second radical feature of the reform relates to the speed and the shortness of the adjustment period 
involved. Compensations were not only temporary and degressive and but also to be paid during a 
short period of time.  Thirdly, the reform constituted a radical simplification and an essential 
institutional change. The main emphasis of the Swedish reform was on removing some instruments 
not on making less use of them. The strategy behind this approach was to prevent the instruments from 
slipping back to use again, at it was the case of reform of 1967. The intervention buying was 
eliminated. Thus, the stabilisation of agricultural markets, commonly used as a justification for 
intervention in the sector in several countries, was left to the market institutions, some of them yet to 
develop. It was argued in the policy proposal (Jordbruksdepartamentet, 1989) that contractual 
arrangements between farmers and processing industry etc. will evolve and that this will contribute to 
the stability of agricultural markets. Finally, the official status of the farm income objective changed 
from being an objective per se to a precondition for achievement of other objectives. By adopting and 
consistently applying the principle that farming is no different than other sectors in the economy, the 
very foundations of agricultural policy were undermined.  
 
Natural economic experiments are rare. It would have been fascinating to study the impact of the 
Swedish agricultural policy reform, fully implemented. This would have implied that most of the 
transitory measures, in particular, arable land payments, would have expired. Because of the accession 
to the EU, this has never occurred. Hence, the reform was never fully put into a test. In particular, anti-
bankruptcy measures were not tested. Because the process has been interrupted the most interesting 
question about the reform appears to be why it was possible. 
 
To start with, it is easy to eliminate some of the usual reasons. The reform was not a result of 
“management by crisis”, caused by external pressures or budgetary problems, as it seems to be the 
case with, for instance, reforms of the CAP (Petit et al 1986, Moyer and Josling 1990). Rather it seems 
motivated by efficiency considerations. The reform decision was taken ahead of the URAA and much 
in excess of the requirements to fulfil the obligations. Moreover, it was anticipated that a future GATT 
agreement will require additional adjustments. Albeit raising costs of export subsidies for grains 
constituted a burden to the budget, the problem could have been solved by less radical measures, for 
instance by setting more land aside. 
 
Daugbjerg (op cit) claims that the reform can be explained by the absence of cohesion in the 
agricultural policy network, which in turn explains why Swedish agricultural state actors did not form 
a coalition with status quo minded farmers. Daugbjerg attributes the lack of the cohesion to the 
existence of the Consumer Delegation. Reviewing his work, Rabinowicz (2002) questioned whether 
networks could be seen as exogenous in the system pointing to the fact that the Consumer Delegation 
itself was a result of a policy decision. Instead, many factors seem to have contributed to the reform. 
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relative strength of them.  
 
To begin with, it could be noted that there are some specific features of Swedish politics/economy 
which make a radical reform more likely here. Sweden has had a long tradition of attaching at least 
some importance to other considerations than farm interests as evidenced by the existence of the 
Consumer Delegation and by the intentional import of a part of sugar consumption form developing 
countries. Moreover, as described earlier, a radical reform of agricultural policy had occurred also in 
the 60s. The 1967 reform was aiming at speeding up structural change. The logic of the reform was 
that a sizeable share of farm labour could be employed more gainfully elsewhere which would also 
improve the income of those remaining in the sector. Similar ideas were expressed in 1968 in the 
famous memorandum of Mansholt but were rejected in the EC (Neville-Rolfe, 1984).  
 
It could be argued that both the existence of the Consumer Delegation and radical reforms are results 
of the fact that Swedish politics have been dominated by Social Democrats who do not rely on farm 
votes. However, Social Democrats were occasionally dependent on a support from a centrist agrarian 
party which benefited farmers. Weakening of the strategic position of the agrarians due to changing 
co-operation pattern in late 80s constituted a window of opportunity for a reform of agricultural 
policy. 
  
Agricultural policy in Sweden was seen by the reformers coming from the Ministry of Finance as one 
of the structural problems of the Swedish economy. The reform can be directly linked with several 
other policy reforms, all of them in a market-oriented direction, within and outside agriculture. Those 
include removal of milk quota, reform of crop insurance system, tax reform, deregulation of credit 
market and several other commodity or service markets.  
 
The cost of maintenance of an existing order is inversely related to the perceived legitimacy of the 
existing system (North, 1981). Declining legitimacy was doubtfully a major explanation why it was 
possible to reform the policy. Even the Federation of Swedish Farmers (LRF) accepted, albeit 
reluctantly, that agricultural policy had to be reformed. It seems highly probable that farmers would 
not give up that easy if the policy would have been more popular and the general public more 
sympathetically inclined. Moreover, all political parties, but the Greens who had remaining minor 
objections, even the agrarian Centre Party supported the main ideas. This indicates a belief by the 
politicians that the reform would be popular with voters. The loss of the legitimacy could be explained 
by the fact that the policy was repeatedly criticised in an open public debate involving numerous 
participants outside the traditional “iron triangle” of specialised politician, agricultural bureaucracy 
and pressure groups. Thereby, those groups have lost their agenda setting power. High and rising food 
prices contributed both to the consumer discontent with agricultural policy and to the concerns of 
policy makers about high inflationary pressures. 
 
The reform was initiated by the Ministry of finance and managed by “outsiders” confirming an 
observation by A Winters (1995) that sectoral ministries will generally not be willing or able to run 
liberal trade policies. The clever organisation of the work on the reform and of the management of the 
process of arriving at the draft proposal which limited the access of pressure groups and implied an 
avoidance of early haggling about minor changes of the policy have certainly contributed to the 
success. Arriving at a consensus about “basic economics” of agricultural policy seems to have been 
important as well. The relevance of such a consensus should be seen in view of an investigation by 
Nilsson (1993), who has demonstrated that politicians often have wrong perceptions about how 
agricultural policy operates. Several members in both Standing Committee on Agriculture and 
Standing Committee on Finance of Swedish parliament believed, for instance, that lower grain prices 
would result in an increased application of fertiliser by farmers. 
 
Even if some of the explanations above connect to idiosyncrasies of Swedish society it should be 
observed that Sweden has retained her liberal views on agricultural policies. After joining the EU, 
Sweden became one of the most ardent critics of the CAP. This indicates that the reform of 1990 was 
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preferences has taken place and that changes are also likely elsewhere. Several contributing factors 
could be distinguished. In particular, new stakeholders, especially environmentalists, have emerged 
and gained strength. A continuous decline in numbers of farmers has obvious implications for their 
political representation as well as for the relevance of farm incomes as a societal objective. Importance 
of farming for sustaining of rural regions has declined too.  Much fewer of the consumers have 
relatives in the countryside implying a loss of a natural identification with farmers and agriculture. 
 
As pointed out before, only limited lessons can be drawn from the implementation of the policy. 
Nevertheless some positive experiences can be identified. It was possible to remove several 
regulations and to simplify the agricultural policy considerably. In spite of somewhat sceptical attitude 
in advance, market agents managed to adjust smoothly. The new, market oriented system, became 
soon be quite popular. Spillovers of market oriented behaviour could be observed even in other parts 
of the food chain, which were only indirectly affected by the reform. Andersson (1992) observes that 
wholesalers changed their bargain strategy. Instead of accepting high food prices and bargain for 
various rebates (used in weekly advertisements campaigns) the level of prices became a subject for 
negotiations as well. This occurred when the semi-annual price reviews disappeared.  
This paper focused on a case study of the reform of 1990. It is not easy to test a theory on a single 
case. Nevertheless, a short comment on the theory might be in place. Traditional pressure group model 
appears not to have much to offer when it comes to understanding agricultural policy reform(s) in 
Sweden. Without taking into account the legitimacy of the policy and within narrow framework which 
only focus on agricultural sector the reform appears incomprehensible.  
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